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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20040190-SC

vs.
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
*

& rk

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Responding within minutes to a report of someone screaming for help at 3:14 a.m.,
police found only one person at the scene, defendant, who was walking down a dead end
road carrying two cloth bags. After defendant gave police an inconsistent answer regarding
his intended destination, the officers retained his license to run a warrants check.
Did police have the minimal level of justification necessary to temporarily detain
defendant for further investigation?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f

8, 6 P.3d 1133. The Court "review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law based on these
findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of
the legal standard to the facts." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const amend IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony,
and possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. R. 3-4. He moved to suppress
evidence seized from his person and bag in a search incident to arrest, arguing that his
detention for a warrants check was not supported by reasonable suspicion. See R. 53-70.
After ahearing, the trial court denied his motion. R. 78-81 (Addendum B); R. 110-11.1 The
court of appeals granted defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal, and in a 2-1 published
memorandum decision, reversed. State v. Markland, 2004 UT App 1, 84 P.3d 240.

The trial court's findings were based on evidence taken from both the suppression
hearing (Addendum C) and the preliminary hearing (Addendum D). See R. 1-2, 10.
2

SUMMARY OF FACTS

At 3:14 a.m. on April 30, 2001, the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office received a
report that a woman was "screaming or crying out for help" in an area just east of the
Bridgeside Landing Apartments. R. 111:3-4,7,10. Deputy Ed Spotten and his partner were
dispatched to the location and arrived within five minutes of the report. R. 51; R. 111:3-6.
The deputies turned onto a dead end road just east of the apartments. R. 111:3-6. The road,
which was not lit, led to a basketball court and a fenced bike path with a locked gate. R.
111:3-5,8.
When Deputy Spotten turned onto the road, he saw defendant, carrying two "over-theshoulder" bags, walking down the road toward the locked gate. R. 111: 6, 8. No one else
was in the area. R. 111: 6. After pulling up next to defendant, the deputies exited their patrol
car and initiated contact with defendant. R. 111: 7. On inquiry, defendant denied hearing
anyone scream for help. R. 111:7. Deputy Spotten asked defendant where he was going.
R. I l l : 10-11. Although defendant told the officers he was walking home (some twenty
blocks away), there was no way for him to get there the way he was walking. R. 111:10-11;
R. 80.
Deputy Spotten asked defendant for his name and some identification so he could run
some "checks" on him. R. 49; R. 111: 9,12. Deputy Spotten retained the identification and
radioed dispatch requesting a criminal history and warrants check. R. 49-50; R. 111: 9. In
less than five minutes, dispatch notified Deputy Spotten that there was a warrant for
defendant's arrest. R. 111:9-10. Deputy Spotten arrested defendant on the warrant, and in a
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search incident to arrest, found methamphetamine in the pocket of defendant's jacket and
crushed marijuana in one of his bags. R. 46-47; R. I l l : 10.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Responding within minutes to a report of someone screaming for help at 3:14 a.m.,
police found only one person at the scene, defendant, who was walking down a dead end
road carrying two cloth bags. After defendant gave police an inconsistent answer regarding
his intended destination, the officers retained his license to run a warrants check. The police
had reasonable suspicion based on the following facts: (1) a citizen reported that a woman
was screaming for help just east of the apartments; (2) deputies observed defendant in the
vicinity of the disturbance within minutes of the report; (3) it was in the middle of the night
(3:14 a.m.) and no one else was in the area; (4) defendant said he was walking home, which
was nearly twenty blocks away; and (5) defendant could not get home in the direction he was
walking. These facts, viewed together, supported a reasonable inference that criminal
activity involving defendant "may be afoot." Defendant's brief detention for a warrants
check was therefore justified and the court of appeals' opinion should be reversed.

4

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF DETENTION TO RUN A WARRANTS
CHECK WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968), the
U.S. Supreme Court observed that the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to mean that
"police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure

" However, as in Terry, "we deal here with an

entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical
matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure." Id. Accordingly, Deputy Spotten's
decision to check defendant for warrants "must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
In order to assess the reasonableness of a stop, courts must "'balancfe] the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.'" Id. at 20-21, 88
S.Ct. 1879 (citations omitted). Terry recognized that the government has a legitimate
interest in effective crime prevention and detection. Id. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. As a result,
the Court held, "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
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manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Id. (emphasis added).
The Terry stop, as it has come to be known, is justified "if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' . . . . " United
States v. &?£oW,490U.S. 1,7,109S.Ct. 1581,1585 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30,
88 S.Ct. at 1884-85); accord State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, «| 11, 999 P.2d 7. In other words, a
Terry stop may not be based on "inarticulate hunches." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at
1880. On the other hand, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level
required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of
the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751
(2002). Accordingly, "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule
out the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. at 753. Simply
put, there need only be articulable facts from which an officer can reasonably infer that
criminal activity "may be afoot." See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
When examining an investigatory stop, "it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted). In
assessing reasonable suspicion, "[cjourts must view the articulable facts in their totality and
avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other."
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14, 78 P.3d 590. "In considering the totality of the
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circumstances, [courts should] "'judge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and
ordinary human experience... and [ ] accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish
between innocent and suspicious actions.5" State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, If 8,47 P.3d
932 (quoting United States v. Williams, 211 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)); accord
Warren, 2003 UT 36, atfflf20-21 (holding that courts should consider an officer's subjective
assessment of the facts).
Applying the reasonable suspicion standard here, the objective facts confronting the
deputies at the time of the detention reasonably suggested that criminal activity involving
defendant "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Deputy Spotten and his
partner responded to the Bridgeside Landing Apartments within minutes of a report that a
woman was "screaming or crying out for help." R. 111: 3-4,7,10. To reach the location of
the reported disturbance, the deputies turned onto a dead-end road that ran behind the
apartments and saw defendant walking down the road carrying two "over-the-shoulder"
bags. R. I l l : 3-6, 8. No one else was in the area. R. I l l : 6. Defendant denied hearing
anything and told the officers that he was walking home. R. 111: 10-11. Yet, "there was no
way for the defendant to get home walking in the direction he was headed.. .." R. 79: ^f 13.
R. I l l : 10-12. Defendant was walking to an area that he could not pass—at the end of the
road was a six-foot fence, with a locked gate. R. I l l : 3-5, 12. At best, defendant would
have been required to scale a locked and gated fence. R. I l l : 12.
The deputies' suspicions, therefore, were not based on an "inarticulate hunch," but on
the following facts: (1) a citizen reported that a woman was screaming for help just east of
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the apartments; (2) deputies observed defendant in the vicinity of the disturbance within
minutes of the report; (3) it was in the middle of the night (3:14 a.m.) and no one else was in
the area; (4) defendant said he was walking home, which was nearly twenty blocks away;
and (5) defendant could not get home in the direction he was walking. These facts, viewed
together, supported a reasonable inference that criminal activity involving defendant "may be
afoot."
Although the scream for help and defendant's presence and activities in the immediate
vicinity of the scream could be explained as innocent, "'officers need not close their eyes to
suspicious circumstances.'" Beach, 2002 UT App 160, at f 11 (quoting Williams, 271 F.3d
at 1270). While the scream for help may have been precipitated by an injury or some other
innocent cause, the deputy could reasonably infer that it was precipitated by an assault, rape,
robbery, or other crime. That inference was bolstered where the scream occurred in the
middle of the night and raised enough concern that a citizen reported it to police. And while
defendant's presence in the area might have been wholly innocent, the deputy could
reasonably infer that defendant was the cause of the scream for help—not only was he found
walking in a peculiar area at an unusual time, but he was spotted within minutes of the
disturbance, in the very vicinity where it reportedly occurred, and was the only person in the
area. SeeR. 111:3-4,7,10.
Additionally, defendant told the deputies that he was walking to his home some
twenty blocks away. R. I l l : 10-11. Yet, the dead end road upon which he traveled did not
lead him home or anywhere else. R. 111: 10-11; R. 80: ^j 2(c). Like unprovoked flight, an

8

answer that is inconsistent with the facts "is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it
is certainly suggestive of such." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-26, 120 S.Ct 673,
676-77 (2000) (finding reasonable suspicion based on defendant's presence in high crime
area and unprovoked flight); accord United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir.
2003) (holding that an inconsistent story adds to reasonable suspicion), cert denied,—U.S.
—, 124 S.Ct. 1526 (2004); United States Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing that inconsistent answers concerning destination adds to reasonable suspicion).
The court of appeals observes, however, that the facts known to the officers at the
time were at least as consistent with lawful behavior as with criminal behavior. See id. at ff
7, 9 & n.3 (citing Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, \ 19, 998 P.2d 274. In applying
such a test, the court of appeals impermissibly elevates the reasonable suspicion standard to a
level that approximates, if not exceeds, the probable cause or preponderance of the evidence
standards. Less than two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[a] determination that
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct."
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277,122 S.Ct. at 753. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment "accepts the risk
that officers may stop innocent people." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126,120 S.Ct. at 677. Where
reasonable suspicion exists, officers are permitted to "detain the individuals to resolve [any]
ambiguity." Id. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 677.
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from State v. Carpena, 1\A P.2d 674 (Utah
1986), and State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987), upon which the court of
appeals relied. See Markland, 2004 UT App 1, at \ 8.
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In Carpena, a patrol officer stopped a car with out-of-state license plates that was
moving slowly through a burglary-prone neighborhood late at night. After specifically
noting that no criminal activity was observed by the officer and that "no report of a burglary
had been reported to the police that night" the Supreme Court concluded that the officer did
not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675 (emphasis added).
In Trujillo, an officer stopped the defendant, who was carrying a knapsack, and two
companions at 3:30 a.m. after he observed them walking slowly down a sidewalk and
peering into window displays. Specifically noting that the officer "could not recall receiving
reports of any criminal activity in the area that morning/' the court of appeals concluded that
the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89.
These cases stand for the settled principle that "traveling at what may seem a
suspicious time in a suspicious location alone is insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,143 (Utah App. 1997). However, these cases
also implicitly hold that the result would be different if there had been afresh report of
possible criminal activity.
Relying on Trujillo, the court of appeals equates a recent report of screaming for help
in the area with a general "high-crime factor in the area." Morkland, 2004 UT App 1,^8.
Trujillo does not support that proposition, but the contrary. The officers in Trujillo based
their stop "merely on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in the area." 739
P.2d at 89. Trujillo held that these factors alone were insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion, but specifically suggested that additional information from the suspect or a recent
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"report[ ] of any criminal activity in the area" would have created reasonable suspicion. Id.
Marklandis therefore in direct conflict with Trujillo, which distinguishes the two factors and
gives virtually controlling weight to the recent report of possible criminal activity.
As noted, the two deputies in this case observed defendant walking alone at
approximately 3:15 a.m. "down a dead-end road 'where he could not get anywhere.'"
Markland, 2004 UT App 1,16 (quoting trial court's findings and conclusions at R. 80:1
2(c)). If the deputies had only these facts before them, the detention would have been
unlawful under controlling precedent. See Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143 (holding that
"traveling at what may seem a suspicious time in a suspicious location is insufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion"). They had more. Indeed, the deputies had the very fact
Carpena and Trujillo suggested would be sufficient under such circumstances to establish
reasonable suspicion—a fresh report of possible criminal activity in the location defendant
was seen traveling. See Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89.
The majority below also reversed in large measure based on its assertions that
"Deputy Spotten did not testify that he had any suspicions of criminal activity concerning
Defendant" and "did not make a connection between Defendant and the reported screaming."
Id. at 11 7-9. To the contrary, Deputy Spotten testified that defendant was suspicious
because he was "in the area where the call came from," he was in a "dead end area," it was
"3:00 in the morning," and he was "in the back of a complex where he does not live." See R.
I l l : 12-13. Deputy Spotten also noted that defendant could not get home the way he was
walking. R. 111:10-12. In other words, Deputy Spotten testified that his own evaluation of
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the circumstances led him to suspect that defendant was connected to a crime that
precipitated a scream for help. Therefore, the majority's reliance on State v. Chapman, 921
P.2d 446 (Utah 1996), and Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 998 P.2d 274, where the
officers testified that they had no suspicions of criminal wrongdoing, was misplaced.2
* * *

In summary, the facts and circumstances before Deputy Spotten " ' warranted] a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was necessary." Terry, 392 U.S. at
21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals.

To the extent the court of appeals' opinion holds that reasonable suspicion requires
an officer to provide the trial court with a subjective basis for an investigative stop, it is
clearly incorrect. Although an officer's subjective assessment of the facts is an appropriate
factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of a stop, "an officer's subjective belief
alone is insufficient to validate or invalidate" a Terry stop. See Warren, 2003 UT 36, at ^[
20-21 (referring to a Terry frisk). As held in Terry, "the facts [must] be judged against an
objective standard," not a subjective one. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.
12

Respectfully submitted August 265 2004.
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

5Y S. GRAY
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I hereby certify that on August 26,2004,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Petitioner upon the defendant/respondent David Roger Markland by causing them to be
delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows:
Linda M. Jones
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

S. Gray
fsistant Attorney General
E:\Markland Dav cert brf doc
08/26/2004 11:07 PM

13

Addenda

Addendum A

FILED

This memorandum decision is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

Utah Court of Appeals
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^ " " 2 lob\
Pauistte Stagg
Clerk of the Court

00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(For Official Publication)
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Defendant and Appellant.
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The Honorable William Barrett
Attorneys:

Linda M. Jones and Nisa J. Sisneros, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Kl
David Markland, Defendant, was charged with possession of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and with possession of
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2) (a) (i) (2002) . Defendant moved to suppress the evidence,
arguing that his detention was not supported by reasonable
suspicion and the ensuing search was therefore illegal. The
urial court denied the motion to suppress and Defendant
petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which this court granted.
The issue before this court is whether the trial court properly
denied Defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse.
\2
Defendant argues that the State failed to establish a
reasonable suspicion to support the level two detention.
"[W]hether a particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable
suspicion is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996)
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). "However,
we conduct our review with a measure of discretion given to the
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts."

State v. Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322,117, 57 P.3d 1098
(quotations and citations omitted).
t3
The parties do not dispute that a level two detention
occurred when the police retained Defendant's identification
while they ran a warrants check; instead, they dispute whether
the detention was legal. This court has noted that one level of
"constitutionally permissible encounters between law enforcement
officers and the"public" is a level two detention, whereby "an
officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable
suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a
crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,1110, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)"
(citations omitted)). Defendant argues that Deputy Spottenfs
level two detention was not based on an "articulable suspicion"
that Defendant had "committed or [was] about to commit a crime."
Id.
1[4
If a level two detention is not "'supported by reasonable
suspicion(, it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.'" Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at Hl8 (quoting State
v. Bean", 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). "In
determining whether the officers had a reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify Defendant's temporary detention, we 'look to
the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was
an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity.1" State v.
Beach, 2002 UT App 153,1(8, 47 P. 3d 932 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Humphrey, 937 P. 2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct. App.
1997)) . Further, when "considering the totality of the
circumstances, we 'judge the officer's conduct in light of common
sense and ordinary human experience . . . and we accord deference
to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and
suspicious actions.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)).
1[5
Deputy Spotten testified that he and another officer
responded to a call from dispatch at approximately 3:00 a.m. The
dispatch stated that someone was heard screaming near the east
side of the Bridgeside Landing apartment complex. When the
officers arrived, Defendant was the only individual in the area,
and he was walking down a dark street, carrying two over-theshoulder cloth bags, toward what appeared to be a dead end.
Deputy Spotten testified that he stopped Defendant and inquired
whether Defendant had heard any screaming. Defendant responded
he had not. When asked where he was going, Defendant said he was
walking home. Deputy Spotten asked Defendant's name and
destination, and then requested Defendant's identification.
Deputy Spotten took Defendant's identification and ran a warrants
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check. Upon discovering Defendant had an outstanding warrant,
Deputy Spotten arrested Defendant and conducted a search pursuant
to the arrest.
i[6
When asked at the hearing what was suspicious about
Defendant's behavior, Deputy Spotten responded that "the fact
that [Defendant] was in the area, it's dark out there, it's a
dead end area[J . . . and he's in the back of a complex where he
does not live." Deputy Spotten did not testify to any objective
or subjective connection he made between Defendant and the
reported screaming. Nevertheless, based on this testimony, the
trial court found "that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable
articulable [suspicion] based on the following": the deputy
received a report of a cry for help in the area where Defendant
was, it was late and not well-lit, Defendant was headed down a
dead-end road "where he could not get anywhere," Defendant "said
he was going home"to a location that he could not get to by
traveling in the direction he was headed," and Defendant was
carrying two bags.
^7
Although we grant the trial court a measure of discretion in
its application of the legal standard to the facts, see State v.
Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322, %7, 57 P.3d 1098, we disagree with
its determination that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable
articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in, or about to
engage in, criminal activity. Deputy Spotten did not testify
that he had any suspicions of criminal activity concerning
Defendant. See, e.g., State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah
1996) ("By the officers' own testimony, no independent facts
surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion
that he was involved in any illegal activity . . . . " ) .
In Salt
Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,119, this court held that the
officers did not have a reasonable suspicion "on which to justify
the level two stop, and the seizure, therefore, violated" the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. This court noted that "the
facts known to the officers regarding [the defendant] were at
least as consistent with lawful behavior as with the commission
of a crime." Id. (footnotes omitted). Further, this court
noted, "By [the officers'] own testimony, [they] had no knowledge
of any violation of the law that [the defendant] might have
committed or was about to commit." Id.
U8
In this case, as in Ray, the officers responded to a
suspicious circumstances call, yet they did not observe, have
knowledge of, or have suspicions about any crime that had been
committed or was about to be committed, let alone any crime
Defendant had committed or was about to commit. Although this
case is distinct from Ray, based in part on the lateness of the
hour and the recent report of screaming in the area, this court
has held that a "decision to stop . . . based merely on the
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lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in the area," was
insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct. State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). In Truiillo, the officer observed a trio of men walking
along State Street, in the dark, through what was considered a
high-crime area. See id. The officer was suspicious about a
knapsack one of the men was carrying, although he never inquired
about it.1 See id. Further, once the officer stopped the men,
they appeared "nervous." Id. This court held that the officer
"did not articulate reasonable objective facts for suspecting
[the defendant] had engaged in or was about to engage in criminal
conduct." Id. at 90.
f9
Finally, the totality of circumstances in this case is
insufficient to support "an objective basis for suspecting
criminal activity." State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160,^8, 47 P.3d
932 (quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was in the area
of the "suspicious circumstances" dispatch, the area was dark, he
was carrying two bags, and he was heading down what the officer
thought was a dead-end road. Although "'we accord deference to
an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and
suspicious actions,'" id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 271
F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)), these circumstances are not
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.2 Deputy Spotten
did not observe Defendant engaged in illegal activity; he did not
articulate any grounds for believing that Defendant was, or was

1. In both State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), and this case, the officers were concerned about bags the
respective defendants were carrying. However, in neither case
did the officers inquire about the bags. Additionally, neither
officer could "articulate what concerned him about" the bags in
question. Id.
2. Compare State v. Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322,^14, 57 P.3d
1098 (affirming lower court's finding of reasonable suspicion to
investigate the defendant where the defendant was seen near drug
house under surveillance, was told it was the site of illegal
drug transactions and to leave, yet the defendant returned to the
house, parked in a less conspicuous spot, left his engine
running, and ignored the officer's questioning upon leaving the
house), with State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 828-29 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (holding police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
defendant based on her three minute presence in drug house under
surveillance).
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about to be, engaged in criminal activity; and he did not make a
connection between Defendant and the reported screaming.3
fllO Based on the foregoing, we disagree with the trial court's
determination that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable suspicion to
support the level two detention of Defendant. Therefore, we
reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to
suppress and remand the case for further proceedings as may now
be appropriate.

BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge (dissenting):
1|l2 I dissent. I believe that, at the time he took Defendant's
identification, Deputy Spotten had reasonable suspicion to detain
Defendant to investigate his possible involvement with a reported
cry for help.
Kl3 In the middle of the night, at about 3:00 a.m., the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office received a report that a woman was
3. Further, case law indicates that where an officer observes
behavior that is consistent with illegal activity, officers may
have reasonable suspicion to investigate. Compare State v.
Beach, 2002 UT App 160,1|9, 47 P.3d 932 (holding that where
officer "observed specific behavior that reasonably led him to
suspect that" the defendant was engaged in illegal activity,
officer had reasonable suspicion); with State v. Swanigan, 699
P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (holding officer's stop of
two individuals unconstitutional where stop was based on
description by another officer, who merely saw individuals
walking down street at 1:40 a.m., in area where recent burglary
reported). In this case, however, Deputy Spotten did not observe
Defendant engaged in behavior consistent with illegal activity.
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screaming and crying out for help in an area just east of the
Bridgeside Landing Apartments. Deputy Spotten and his partner
were dispatched to the location and arrived within five minutes.
To reach the location of the reported disturbance, Deputy Spotten
turned onto a dead-end road that ran behind the apartments. At
the end of the road was a six-foot fence, with a locked gate that
led to a bike path.
i[l4 When Deputy Spotten turned onto the road, he saw Defendant
walking toward the locked gate, carrying two "over-the-shoulder"
bags. Defendant was the only person the officers saw in the
vicinity. The officers pulled up next to Defendant and exited
their patrol car. Deputy Spotten told Defendant they had
received a report that someone in the area had been screaming for
help and asked Defendant if he had heard anything. Defendant
replied that he had not. Deputy Spotten then asked Defendant
where he was going. Defendant told the officers that he was
walking home, but the route he was traveling was blocked off and
the address he gave was nearly twenty blocks away.
1|l5 Deputy Spotten asked Defendant for his name and some
identification so he could run some "checks" on him. Deputy
Spotten retained the identification and radioed dispatch,
requesting a criminal history and warrants check. Less than five
minutes later, dispatch notified Deputy Spotten of a warrant for
Defendant's arrest. Deputy Spotten arrested Defendant on the
warrant and, incident to that arrest, searched Defendant's person
and the two bags he was carrying. Deputy Spotten found
methamphetamine in the pocket of Defendant's jacket and crushed
marijuana in one of the bags.
1|l6 Under the totality of the circumstances, the objective facts
known to Deputy Spotten at the time of the detention reasonably
suggested "that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). "Although each of
the series of acts was 'perhaps innocent in itself,' . . . taken
together, they 'warranted further investigation.'" United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 3. Ct. 744, 751 (2002)
(citation omitted).
Hl7 According the trial court the proper "measure of discretion"
to apply the law to the facts, see State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
939 (Utah 1994), I would affirm the order denying Defendant's
motion to suppress.

Russell W. Bench,
^—Associate Presiding Judge

20020965-CA

6

Addendum B

DAVE) E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
MICHAELA D. ANDRUZZI, 7804'
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 011906683
DAVED ROGER MARKLAND,
Hon. William W. Barrett
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this Court for hearing in the above entitled
matter on September 10, 2002. Defendant was represented by counsel, Nisa Sisneros, and the
State was represented by counsel, Michaela D. Andruzzi. The Court having read memoranda
submitted by counsel, and considered arguments of counsel, hereby enters its FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On April 30, 2001, at 3:14 am, Deputy Edward Spotten (Hereinafter Deputy Spotten)
received a dispatch to that informed him that someone was crying out for help in the east part
of the apartment complex on Bridgeside Landing which has its entrance on Sunstone Road at
500 West.
2. The road that runs through the eastern part of the apartment complex ends in a dead-end.
3. At the dead-end there is a basketball court, a bike path that was gated and locked at the time,
and the Jordan river.
4. There was no lighting at that end of the road.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 011906683
Page 2

5. Deputy Spotten arrived at the apartment complex within 5 minutes.
6. Upon arriving at the eastern part of the complex, Deputy Spotten saw the defendant, David
Roger Markland, walking towards the dead-end of the road carrying two bags.
7. Deputy Spotten did not see anyone else in the area.
8. Deputy Spotten pulled up next to the defendant and asked him his name.
9. Deputy Spotten told him that he received a report of screams for help in that area and asked
the defendant if he had heard anything.
10. The defendant responded that he had not heard anything.
11. Deputy Spotten asked the defendant where he was going.
12. The defendant responded that he was going home to 13th East and 45th South.
13. There was no way for the defendant to get home walking in the direction he was headed
when Deputy Spotten stopped him.
14. Deputy Spotten then asked the defendant for identification and told him he was going to
check for warrants.
15. There was a warrant for the defendant and deputy Spotten arrested the defendant.
16. The subsequent search incident to arrest yieled marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug
paraphernalia.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The State concedes that the stop was a level-two stop requiring reasonable articulable
suspicion.
2. The Court finds that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable articulable based on the following five
factors:
a) The deputy received a report that someone was crying for help five minutes earlier in
the area where he found the defendant.
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b) It was late at night and the area was not well lit.
c) The defendant was headed down a dead-end road where he could not get anywhere.
d) The defendant said he was going home to a location that he could not get to by
traveling in the direction in which he was headed.
e) The defendant was carrying two bags with him.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing facts and conclusions the Court enters the following order:
Defendant Markland's motion to suppress is denied.
DATED this Co day of October, 2002.

Approved a s ^ form:

Sisneros
BY T$E jCOURT:

tiJu./Jk-23r •l7
Honorable William W. Barrett
Third District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law was delivered to Nisa Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant David Roger
Markland, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 7- day of
September, 2002.
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Addendum C

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

CaseNo.011906683FS
Appellate Case No. 20020965-SC

DAVID ROGER MARKLAND,
Defendant.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT

DEC

B y _

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

IN*

3 I 2002

SALT

^_g^NTy

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

MICHAELA ANDRUZZI
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

For the Defendant:

NISA J. SISNEROS
LEGAL DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION

INDEX
WITNESS
EDWARD SPOTTEN
Direct Examination by Ms. Andruzzi
Cross Examination by Ms. Sisneros
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 10, 2002

2

HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

MS. SISNEROS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. SISNEROS:

7

THE COURT:

8

Your Honor, we're ready on Markland.

Markland?

Okay.

Let me grab my witness.

Okay.

This is State of Utah vs. David

Markland, case number 011906683. Appearances please.

9

MS. SISNEROS:

Nisa Sisneros for Mr. Markland.

10

MS. ANDRUZZI:

Michaela Andruzzi on behalf of the

11

State, your Honor.

12
13

THE COURT:
Andruzzi?

14
15

One [inaudible] one witness, Ms.

MS. ANDRUZZI:
him but he's here.

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. ANDRUZZI:

18

I'm not sure we're even going to need

here in case we do.

19

THE COURT:

Sorry?
I'm not sure we'll need him, but he's

It would just be one witness.
Just one.

Okay, do you want to call your

20

first witness then?

21

so if there's anybody here who ought not to be here, send them

22

out.

23

I'm going to invoke the exclusionary rule,

MS. ANDRUZZI:

There wouldn't be anybody else.

24

Honor.

25

preliminary hearing transcript.

Your

Attached to Ms. Sisneros's motion, she's attached a
The State was planning on just
1

1

relying on that unless the Court wanted more information.

2

THE COURT:

3

yeah, okay, I'm with you here.

4

Let's hear what he has to say.

5
6

Well, let me refresh my memory.

MS. ANDRUZZI:

Do you have your officer?

All right.

The State would call

Detective - or, sorry, Officer Spotten to the stand.

7

EDWARD SPOTTEN

8

having been first duly sworn, testified

9

upon his oath as follows:

10
11
12
13

Oh,

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. ANDRUZZI:
Q

Will you state your name and spell your last name for

the record please?

14

A

Edward Spotten, last name spelling S-P-O-T-T-E-N.

15

Q

Thank you.

16

A

Deputy for Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.

17

Q

How long have you been a deputy for Salt Lake County?

18

A

Two years eight months.

19

Q

Is that the extent of your law enforcement

20

experience?

21

A

No.

22

Q

What prior experience do you have?

23

A

I worked for Logan City PD as a reserve for about

24

five months.

25

Q

And what is your occupation?

Are you POST certified?
2

1

A

I am,

2

Q

Were you employed by Salt Lake County on April 30 of

3

the year 2001?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And what was your duty assignment on that date?

6

A

I was working the area of Taylorsville to patrol that

8

Q

Great.

9

A

I was.

10

Q

Do you recall receiving a dispatch to a certain

7

11

beat.
Were you on duty at approximately 3:14 a.m.?

location on that date and at that time?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

She called it in the east part of the complex of

What was the nature of the call?

15

Ridgeside Landing that there was somebody screaming or crying

16

out for help.

17

Q

Okay.

And when you say the east side of the complex

18

of Ridgeside Landing, is that in - is that an area that's know

19

as Sunstone Road?

20
21

A

Sunstone Road actually is the entrance to the

complex.

22

Q

All right.

23

A

The east side goes back into the complex a ways, and

24

back past the buildings and back in there there's a little dead

25

end area where there's some basketball courts and then if you
3

1

go over further there's actually the Jordan River.

2

Q

All right.

Well, let's talk about that area.

The

3

area that you received the call that there had been some cries

4

for help; is that correct?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

All right.

7

And now, any area that these cries for

help came from, were there residences?

8

A

The area would be east of the complex area.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

There's actually - there's a row of complex buildings

11

all together, and then there's a road that goes back in where

12

they actually have a basketball court and -

13

Q

And is that the area that you were going?

14

A

That's where they said that they heard the screams.

15

It's actually in that area and right next to that area is also

16

the Jordan River.

17

too.

18
19

Q

It's just a dark wooded area back in there

You've got the river, you've got basketball courts

and a dead end road?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Is there any access to that dead end road other than

22

the one entrance that you now proceeded to?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

No.

Were there any houses on that dead end road?

4

1

Q

Are there any apartments on that dead end road?

2

A

No.

3

Q

There's a basketball court, is there also a bike

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Okay,

8

A

I think it's locked.

9

Q

All right.

10

A

As I recall it was locked and somebody recently tore

4

7

11
12
13
14
15

path?

Is there an entrance to that bike path?

gate?

the gate off, but at that time it was locked.
Q

All right. And what about the basketball courts?

Were they also - was there a gate to get into those?
A

There's no - there's no gate, it's just right on the

side of the road.

16

Q

All right.

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

All right.

19

that call?

20

A

21
22
23

A

So this is 3:14 a.m.?

How long did it take you to respond to

I was there pretty quick.

I was in the area as I

recall.
Q

Give us an estimate when you say pretty quick do you

mean one to two minutes?

Two to three minutes?

24

A

Within five minutes.

25

Q

Within five minutes.
5

1
2
3
4

A

I don't know the exact amount of time.

recall.
Q

All right.

So you received a call that there were

calls for help coming out from this dead end road at 3:14 a.m.

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

You responded to the area.

7

What did you see when you

got to the area?

8

A

I saw a male walking down that road.

9

Q

Okay.

10
11

I don't

Was he walking away from the area in which

you'd been told there were screams for help?
A

He was walking - trying to think which way he was

12

walking - seems like he was walking toward the dead end part of

13

the road.

14

Q

Did you see anybody else there?

15

A

There's nobody else there.

16

Q

Did you see the person that you saw walking on that

17

day on the road-

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

-in the courtroom?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Will you please point to him and tell the Court what

22

he's wearing?

23

A

The blue suit next to the defense attorney.

24

Q

Did you subsequently obtain identification from him?

25

A

Yes.
6

1

Q

And what was the name?

2

A

Roger Markland.

3
4

MS. ANDRUZZI:
of the defendant?

5
6

May the record reflect identification

THE COURT:
Q

It may.

(BY MS. ANDRUZZI)

When you initially saw the

7

defendant walking on this dead end roadf what did you do?

8

you approach him?

9
10
11
12

A

Yes.

What happened?

I pulled up next to him and got out of my car

and made contact with him.
Q

Okay.

At the time that you pulled up next to him

were you in a patrol vehicle?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Did you turn your lights on?

15

Did you have your gun

pulled?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Okay.

18

Did

So you just pulled up next to him and you

started talking to him?

19

A

Correct.

20

Q

What did you - what did you say to him?

21

A

I believe I asked him if he'd heard anything.

I

22

recounted to him that we'd had a call in the area there's a

23

lady screaming for help, wanted to know if he heard anything.

24

He replied he had not.

25

Q

He indicated that he had not heard anything?
7

1

A

Right.

2

Q

All right.

3

Did he have anything with him that seemed

unusual?

4

A

He was carrying a couple of bags.

5

Q

What types of bags?

6

A

Well, they were just over-the-shoulder bags.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

No.

9

Q

All right.

10

A

Cloth bags, yes.

11

Q

He was carrying two bags?

12

A

Right.

13

Q

Is the area well lit?

14

A

No, it's very dark.

15

Q

All right.

16

So we're not talking grocery sacks?

A

Nothing.

18

Q

All right.

A

No.

21

Q

Okay.

23

A

No.

24

Q

All right.

25

Was there any activity going on back

Did you have anything else to explain the

screams for help?

20

22

And it's 3:14 a.m.?

there that would account for his being present at that time?

17

19

Like - like cloth bags?

So you still hadn't found anything to explain

that?

After you asked him if he heard the

screams for help, did you further detain him?

1
2

A

I asked him for some identification and I proceeded

to identify who he was.

3

Q

And how long did that take?

4

A

To identify who he was?

5

Q

Yes.

6

A

He provided me with an i.d.

7

Q

All right.

8

A

So just a matter of seconds.

9

Q

And what did you do with that i.d.?

10

A

I checked through dispatch and ran him and checked

11

him for - to find out what kind of history he may have had,

12

what kind of involvements, and to check him for warrants also.

13

Q

And how long did that take?

14

A

I believe I had a response back in less than five

15
16
17

minutes.
Q

Okay.

Did you indicate to him that that's what you

were doing with his identification?

18

A

Yeah, I did.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

I told him I needed to run some checks.

21

Q

And what did he indicate to you?

22

A

Nothing.

23

Q

All right.

24
25

When you ran the checks, what did you

find out about the defendant?
A

It came back that he had a $5,000 warrant as I
9

1

recall.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

I did.

4

Q

All right.

5

And did you arrest him on that warrant?

Subsequent to that arrest, did you search

the bags?

6

A

Yes, I did.

7

Q

And at that time did you find the drugs that he had

8

in the bags?

9

A

I believe the drugs were found in his - part of the

10

drugs were found in his jacket pocket actually, [inaudible]

11

search.

12

MS. ANDRUZZI:

13

THE COURT:

I don't have any further questions.

I read the transcript that he said he was

14

going home when you asked him what he was doing.

15

where he lived?

16

THE WITNESS:

He stated he lived, I believe it was

17

over in the Murray area.

18

address.

19

something like that.

20

THE COURT:

21

Way.

Do you recall

Probably - I can't remember the exact

I thought he said something like 1300 East or

And he was at 4500 South and Ridgeside

Where's that?

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE' COURT:

Fifth West.

Fifth West?
Yeah.
And he's walking home at 3:14 in the
10

1

morning?

2

THE WITNESS:

That's what he said.

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. SISNEROS:

Okay.

Do you have any questions?

Just some questions that will bring

5

out some of the things that are in the transcript.

6

me to question him on that or -

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. SISNEROS: Okay.

10

THE COURT:

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. SISNEROS:

14
15

If you have some you want to ask go

ahead.

12
13

Well, I've just been kind of looking

through the transcript, so.

9

11

Q

When you stopped Mr. Markland, you immediately tell

him what - why it is that you're stopping him, right?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And then you asked him where he's going?

18

Do you want

Correct?

And he told you he's going home.

19

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

20

Q

And he's in the general area where where his home is?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Well, is he heading towards the area where his home

A

I'm not sure - I'm not sure exactly how he's going to

23
24
25

He's not.

is?

get there based on the dead end road.
11

1
2

Q

Okay.

Well, the Jordan - he's heading towards the

Jordan River area?

3

A

That's his next stop.

4

Q

Is there a walkway along the Jordan area?

5

A

It's all blocked off.

6

complex.

7
8

There's no entrance from that

Q

Is there any way to get into it to crawl over the

gates or?

9

A

If you're going to crawl over a six foot fence.

10

Q

Okay.

11

Then you immediately asked him for his

identification?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay.

And then if you can recall at the preliminary

14

hearing, I asked you if there's anything suspicious about him

15

and do you remember me asking you about that?

16

A

Vaguely.

17

Q

Okay.

18

And your response was that, well, he was in

the area where the call came from.

19

A

Correct.

20

Q

And then I asked you was there anything else

21

suspicious about him.

And you replied no.

Is that correct?

22

A

If that's what I said, that's what I said.

23

Q

Okay, so other than the fact that he's in the area

24

and it's late at night, there's nothing more suspicious about

25

him?
12

1
2

A

Other than the fact that he was in the area, it's

dark out there, it's a dead end area, as I've mentioned,

3

Q

And you mentioned that he's walking?

4

A

Correct,

5

Q

He's not running?

6

A

No.

7

Q

And there's nothing in his hand with, such as a

8

Correct?

dangerous weapon -

9

A

No.

10

Q

Is he acting nervous?

11

A

I don't recall.

12

Q

There's nothing more about his behavior that makes

13
14

It's been too long.

you suspicious of some illegal activity?
A

Other than the fact he was in the area it's 3:00 in

15

the morning, it's dark outside, and he's in the back of a

16

complex where he does not live.

17

MS. SISNEROS:

Okay.

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. ANDRUZZI: No.

20

THE COURT:

Nothing further.

Anything else?

You can step down.

Thank you.

Do you

21

want to submit it or do you want to argue or what do you want

22

to do?

23

MS. SISNEROS:

Well, if I could just quickly.

24

There's three levels in a stop.

25

and question the individual.

The first level you can stop

The initial questioning is fine.
13

1

He's asking him what he's doing there.

Once he takes his

2

identification, he's now detained him and that has risen to a

3

level two stop.

4

the State can -

There's no question about that.

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. SISNEROS:

I don't think

Well, I think the State conceded that.
Right.

Okay.

So the question is

7

whether or not he was justified to raise it to a level two

8

stop.

9

suspicion that this person has committed a crime or is about to

In order to do so, an officer has to have articulable

10

commit a crime.

11

suspicion.

12

take everything that has been stated, the lateness of the hour,

13

the area that he's in, there's just been a crime in the area,

14

that is not enough for reasonable suspicion for a level two

15

stop.

16

That raises it to the level of reasonable

And as I've argued in my memorandum, even if you

There's definite case law that says specifically that

17

in Humphrey, in Stewart, when you've got lateness of an hour,

18

in an

19

cases tnat specifically that say those two taken into

20

consideration, that's not enough.

21

that tells this officer there is something more going on here.

22

He's acting nervous. He has a gun in his hand. He's got a knife

23

readily accessible. He's running away. There's a woman standing

24

right next to him, something that leads us to believe, yeah,

25

this might be the person who just was involved in this crime.

3a where a crime has just been committed, those are

There has to be something

14

1

There's nothing here that tells us anything more than this man

2

is out walking around late at night.

3

Nothing.

Can you stop and question him and ask him, what are

4

you doing?

Why are you in the area?

Where are you going?

5

Yes, he can.

6

ask him further questions, but he doesn't do that. He

7

immediately takes his identification and when he does that, he

8

does it without reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime

9

has been committed.

He can - he can keep him there and continue to

Having done that and not having anything

10

more specific about what it is that he thinks rises to the

11

level of reasonable suspicion, this is an illegal stop and

12

we're asking that you grant our motion and suppress the

13

evidence that was found.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Andruzzi.

15

MS. ANDRUZZI:

16

In Munson and Humphrey, the court held that lateness

Thank you, your Honor.

17

of the hour alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.

18

There may be valid reasons for somebody to be out.

19

true that in Stewart, it indicates that a person's privacy in

20

an area where a crime has been committed is alone not enough.

21

But what we look at is the totality of the circumstances.

22

have a person who's not headed anywhere that we can see would

23

be towards a locked gate, where he's clearly not supposed to

24

be, or over a six foot fence to the Jordan River.

25

headed in the direction where he indicates to the officer that

It's also

We

He's not

15

1

he lives.

He's in a place where a call has just come in that

2

someone is crying out for help, it's dark, he's the only person

3

there, and it's 3:14 in the morning.

4

one or two of these factors, we have all of these factors and

5

we look at them all together.

6

So we have more that just

Clearly the minimal intrusion of a five minute stop

7

to check for someone's identification, Ms. Sisneros is correct

8

and perhaps it wouldn't rise to the level of a level three

9

stop, but certainly the minimal intrusion that's imposed on a

10

defendant by requesting his identification and waiting five

11

minutes for him to run his warrants are clearly merited by the

12

circumstances in this case.

13

investigate those cries for help.

He has a duty to find out if

14

this person is involved in that.

Merely taking the defendant's

15

word for it that he's not involved in somebody crying out for

16

help would not be enough.

17

did was reasonable under the circumstances.

18

the defendant had any prior involvement of this kind.

19

the warrant's check.

20

warrant.

21

circumstances, it was clearly merited by the circumstances.

22

Thank you.

23

The officer had a duty to

He must do more than that.

What he

He ran to see if
He ran

Came back with the defendant had a

Under the circumstances, and looking at all the

MS. ANDRUZZI:

Just quickly.

He does have the duty

24

to stop and question him, what he ^doesn't have the duty to do

25

and he doesn't have probable - a reasonable suspicion to do is
16

1

to stop and detain him.

2

Truiillo, because we do have a case there, it's late at night.

3

It's in a high crime area and we have a person walking with a

4

knapsack in what the officer called a suspicious manner.

5

do have all of those situations there, and the court even in

6

that case with all three of those factors said that's not

7

enough.

8

MS. SISNEROS:

9

THE COURT:

I draw your attention to State v.

You

And, your Honor, if I could just -

Well, that's okay, because I've made up

10

my mind.

I think there's - there are a couple of added factors

11

that played into what I believe was an appropriate stop by the

12

officer, and that is headed down a dead end road where he can't

13

go anywhere, can't get anywhere, is suspicious enough in my own

14

mind.

15

his home was nowhere in the area.

16

three factors that you just mentioned, Ms. Sisneros, but those

17

two additional factors that play heavy on me in terms of my

18

belief that the officer was doing what he should have done

19

appropriately.

20

pursuing it further just because the whole circumstance didn't

21

make any sense.

22

that tells him he's going home?

And then the fact that he said he was going home, and

I believe he would have been remiss in not

He was there on a call and here's this guy

23

MS. SISNEROS:

24

THE COURT:

25

So you not only have the

With no way to go home?

Can I just address that?

No.

Because I -

Those are the facts that I find, and

I believe it's sufficient and I'm going to deny the motion.
17

1

Ms. Andruzzi, you can prepare an appropriate order.

2

MS. ANDRUZZI:

3

or just an order?

4
5

Would the Court like findings on that,

THE COURT:

I don't know.

so I'd make findings.

6

MS. ANDRUZZI: All right.

7

THE COURT:

8

11
12
13

So submit them to her for her approval as

to form.

9
10

She'll probably appeal it,

Do we need to schedule this for trial or anything or
what?
MS. ANDRUZZI:

We probably can schedule it for a

scheduling conference.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let's do that.

Let's - let's

14

do it on the 24"h of September at 8:30 for a scheduling

15

conference.

16

MS. ANDRUZZI:

Thank you, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Addendum D

PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT
STATE OF UTAH V. DAVID MARKLAND

CASE NO.
JUDGE; (J)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: (D)
ATTORNEY FOR PROSECUTION: (P)
WITNESS #1:(W)
WITNESS #2: (W)
CHARGE: - 3°
DATE OF HEARING:

We're here in the matter of State v. David Roger Markland. Set for Preliminary Hearing.
Case number 011906683. Mr. Markland is present with his counsel, Ms. Sisneros. Ms.
Cook representing the State. And we're ready to proceed then?
We are.
Very good. Do you waive formal reading of the information, Ms. Sisneros?
Yes, Your Honor.
Let me just for my own information [inaudible] charges are here. Mr. Markland, you're
charged with what appears to be two counts. And that's Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, at 4517 South Bridgeside Way, Salt Lake
County, on or about April 30lh, 2001. And it's alleged that you did knowingly and
intentionally have in your possession a controlled substance, that being
methamphetamine. And count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class
B misdemeanor, at the same place and date - the substance alleged to have been

1

marijuana. Are you ready to proceed, Ms. Cook?
>

P:

We are, Your Honor.

5

J:

Okay.

I

P:

The State calls Deputy Spotten.

i

J:

Come on up and be sworn, [witness is sworn] You may proceed.

5

P:

Thank you. Would you please state your name?

J

W:

Edward Spotten.

I

P:

And how do you spell your last name?

)

W:

S-P-O-T-T-E-N.

)

P:

What is your occupation?

W:

Deputy for Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office.

I

P:

How long have you been doing that?

!

W:

Two and a half years. Three years, about.

1

P:

And were you so employed on April 30th, year 2001?

5

W:

I was.

>

P:

And on that date did you have occasion to be in the area of 4517 South Bridgeside Way?

7

W:

I did.

5

P:

Is that in Salt Lake County?

?

W:

It's in Taylorsville.

3

P:

Is Taylorsville in Salt Lake County?

1

W:

Yes. It is.

2

P:

Can you tell me why you were in that area?

Yes. We received a call because there was somebody crying out or yelling to stop.
Something to that effect. We didn't know what it was. Kind of suspicious circumstance
call.
Were you sent to investigate that crying out?
Yes.
And when you went to that area, did you observe anything or anyone that caught >our
attention?
We saw a male walking away from the area where the call supposedly came in.
Did you stop to talk with that man?
I did.
Do you see that male here in the courtroom today?
I do.
Can you please point to him and tell me what he's wearing?
Yes. He's wearing the dark bluejacket.
And did you later learn this male's name?
Yes.
What was that name?
David Roger Markland.
Your Honor, if the record could reflect he has identified the defendant.
Witness has identified the defendant.
Thank you. After you obtained Mr. Markland's name, did you do anything with that
information?

3

1

W:

I checked with our dispatch. Ran it for warrants. Verified his ID. Things like that.

P:

Did you discover anything?

W:

Yes, I did.

P:

What did you discover?

W:

He had a warrant for his arrest.

P:

And after learning that, what did you do?

W:

I placed him into custody and served the warrant on him.

P:

And after Mr. Markland was placed into custody, did you do anything with him then?

W:

Yes. I performed a search incident to arrest.

P:

Did you discover anything during that search?

W:

Yes, we did. We discovered some paraphernalia and some drugs.

P:

What did you have done with those controlled substances?

W:

We actually have field test kits that we carry with us. And we field tested the marijuana
and we field tested the meth, both of which flashed positive for the substances.

P:

And do you know if those were later sent to the State crime lab?

5

W:

They were.

7

P:

Your Honor, if I could approach the witness.

8

J:

You may.

9

P:

I'm handing you what's previously been marked for identification as State's exhibit

0

number 1. Do you recognize that?

1

W:

Yes.

2

P:

Can you tell me what that is?

1

W:

This is the results from the crime lab analysis.

2

P:

And do those results relate to this case?

3

W:

They do.

4

P:

How do you know that?

5

W:

On the top of the page here, it has the case number. 01 dash 46288.

6

P:

And is that the same as the case number in front of you?

7

W:

It is.

8

P:

Does Mr. Markland's name appear in that report?

9

W:

I believe it does. Yes. Right there.

10

P:

Your Honor, the State moves for the admission of exhibit I.

11

J:

Any objection, Ms. Sisneros?

12

D:

No, Your Honor.

13

J:

It will be received.

14

P:

Thank you. Deputy, if you would please read the results of the tox. I believe you'll find

15
16

them at the bottom of the page.
W:

Controlled Substance Analysis. Item number 1. Methamphetamine was identified in the

17

plastic bag. Total weight of the white crystal was 10 milligrams. Item number 3. The

18

plastic bag was found to contain 110 milligrams of crushed marijuana. The hand-rolled

19

cigarette was not analyzed.

20

P:

And Deputy, quickly. The tox report refers to methamphetamine found in a plastic bag.

21

Do you recall specifically where on Mr. Markland's person the plastic bag with

22

methamphetamine was located?

5

W:

Yes, I do.

P:

Where was that?

W:

There was a white plastic container in his suit jacket. And it was inside that container.

P:

And was this a suit jacket that he was actually wearing at the time?

W:

Yes.

P:

Do you recall where the baggie of marijuana was found?

W:

It was in a black bag that he was carrying with him.

P:

Thank you. I have nothing further at this time.

J:

Ms. Sisneros?

D:

You say that you received a call that someone was crying out?

W:

Uh huh.

D:

Was this over dispatch?

W:

Yes, it was. There's a case number. If you'd like that, I can give it to you.

D:

How long would you say it took you to get to the point where you see Mr Markland?

W:

It was shortly after I arrived. I couldn't be exact. Just a few minutes.

D:

From the time that you received this call from dispatch to the time that you see Mr.
Markland. About how much time?

W:

Maybe three or four minutes.

D:

So when you received the dispatch, where are you?

W:

I don't recall where I was. It's been a long time ago. I know it was fairly short though.

D:

Could you estimate maybe a mile? A block?

W:

I can't. I don't remember exactly where I was. I know that I responded to the call.

6

1

D:

And when you arrived, did you hear anyone crying out?

2

W:

I did not.

3

D:

Did you stop and listen for a minute before you approached Mr. Markland?

4

W:

Did I stop and listen? I don't recall actually if I did stop and listen or not. I just responded

5

to the area where responding to suspicious circumstance. I observed a male walking away

6

from the area where there was someone crying out according to what dispatch had told us.

7

D:

So immediately when you arrive in the area, you see Mr. Markland.

8

W:

That's correct.

9

D:

Why is it that you stop and talk to him?

10

W:

He's in an area where there's no apartments. It's actually back just a little way east of the

11

apartment complex. It's an area that's blocked off. There used to be an entranceway there

12

from exits 4500 South and they've blocked that off so you have to come in through

13

Sunstone Row. And it's dark, not a well-lit area. Which is where the crying out

14

supposedly had come from.

15

D:

And what time of day is this?

16

W:

It's in the middle of the night. I can look through the report and give you the exact time if

17

you like. 3:14 in the morning.

18

D:

And when you see Mr. Markland, what is he doing?

19

W:

He's walking.

20

D:

So is he walking through this blocked off area? Was he walking out of the...

21

W:

He's walking towards the area that's blocked off.

22

D:

When you see him, is he on the sidewalk still?

7

i

W:

It's an actual roadway. He's walking in the middle of the roadway.

2

D:

By roadway, what do you mean?

3

W:

It's like, well, it's like an entrance to a complex but it's actually like a paved road. If

4

you're entering into a private property, a lane, maybe. Like part of a lane. Cars can travel

5

on it.

6

D:

And he's headed into this blocked off area?

7

W:

He's headed towards the gate that's closed. Yes.

8

D:

And you said there's nothing located in that area?

9

W:

There is... I was there just recently. There's a basketball court there. There's an entrance

0

to the bike path, which was locked at the time.

1

D:

Do you see anyone else in the area?

2

W:

There's nobody else.

3

D:

Is there anything suspicious about defendant, about this defendant that would make you

4

think that maybe he was involved?

5

W:

Just the fact that he was there in the area where the call had came from.

6

D:

Anything else?

7

W:

No.

8

D:

When you approach him, do you ask him for his identification or do you just...

9

W:

Yes.

0

D:

... ask him for his name?

1.

W:

I asked him for ID too.

2

D:

And do you take his identification and then go check for warrants?

8

Yes. I got his ID and checked it for warrants.
Before you... well, tell me. When you first initially contact him, do you immediately ask
him for his identification?
I ask him at some point right when we first contacted him. Yes.
Do you tell him at all about why you're stopping him?
Yes, I did. I told him we were investigating a suspicious circumstance.
And does he respond to you at all about that?
I believe. It's been a long time but I thought he said he was going home or something to
that effect.
Do you ask him if he's involved with someone who's been crying out or do you ask him
why he's there?
I don't recall. I just remember him telling me that he said he was going home.
Do you recall any kind of a conversation about somebody having been crying out?
I think I asked him if he heard anything.
And do you recall what his answer was?
It's been too long. I can't remember.
Now you take his identification and you run it for warrants at that point?
Yes.
Is Mr. Markland standing? Sitting?
Standing.
And how far away is he from where you are?
Five, ten feet.

9

1

D:

When you run...

2

W:

There was a deputy with me at the time.

3

D:

There's another deputy?

4

W:

Yes.

5

D:

Does he arrive with you or does he arrive later?

6

W:

He was with me.

7

D:

So is he standing with Mr. Markland while you run the warrant check?

8

W:

I believe so.

9

D:

Now Mr. Markland is not handcuffed.

0

W:

No. Not at all.

1

D:

But the other officer is standing next to him.

2

W:

Correct, We watch each other. We look out for each other. That's correct.

3

D:

And then the warrant comes back at that point. And then do you arrest him immediately

4

at that point?

5

W:

I advised him that he had a warrant and he was going to be under arrest. Yes.

6

D:

And you handcuffed him at that point?

7

W:

I did.

8

D:

And this bag that you search, is that a bag that he has in his hands or over his shoulder?

9

W:

He was carrying it on his person. How he was carrying it, I don't recall. But it was in his

0

possession. Carrying it.

1

D:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

2

J:

Thank you. Any redirect?

10

1

P:

No, Your Honor. Thank you.

2

J:

All right, Ms. Cook. Any further witnesses?

3

P:

The State rests.

4

J:

You may step down. Thank you. Anything further from counsel?

5

D:

No, Your Honor. I have advised my client that I believe he should not testify and I believe

6

that he will be taking that advice.

7

J:

Mr. Markland, are you going to take your attorney's advice?

8

Defendant:

9

J:

All right. Thank you. Both sides rest, then?

10

D:

We'll submit it, Judge.

11

J:

OK. Thank you. Based on the testimony I've heard, I do find that there is probable cause

I am, Your Honor.

12

to believe that both counts I and counts II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled

13

Substance, third degree felony, possession of a substance being methamphetamine, and

[4

Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor, the substance

5

being marijuana did occur and that the defendant was the person that committed those

6

offenses. Therefore, I'll bind the defendant over to answer in District Court on both

7

offenses.

11

